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Cook v. Gates and Witt v. Department of the Air
Force: Judicial Deference and the Future of
Don't Ask Don't Tell
GUSTAVO OLIVEIRAt
I. INTRODUCTION
President Barack Obama campaigned on the promise of repealing
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT), the law that bars homosexuals from
serving openly in the military.' However, since taking office, President
Obama has come under criticism from gay rights advocates who have
grown impatient with the President's slow progress on this issue.2 In
response, the President stated that he remains committed to overturning
DADT.3
The place of gay men and lesbians in the military has been an
ongoing area of policy inquiry for over seventy years.4 The earliest
attempts to regulate homosexual behaviors within the armed forces were
sporadic and rudimentary.5 Although gay men have served in the mili-
tary as far back as the Revolutionary War, it was not until 1916 that the
military officially prohibited sodomy.6
During World War II, a uniform prohibition on homosexual service
was incorporated into military regulations, based primarily on the theory
that homosexuality was incompatible with military service.7 For the next
forty years, homosexuality served as an outright disqualifier for military
t J.D./L.L.M. Candidate 2010, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to thank
Justin Browder and Freddy Funes for their editing help. Special thanks to Varee Poochareon.
1. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, On Gay Issues, Obama Asks To Be Judged on Vows Kept, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2009, at A14.
2. Id.
3. Id. The President stated that he wishes to work closely with the Pentagon and the United
States Congress to overturn DADT in a "practical way ... that takes over the long term." Id.
4. DON'T ASK DON'T TELL: DEBATING THE BAN IN THE MILITARY 12 (Aaron Belkin &
Geoffrey Bateman eds., 2003) (noting that, despite the armed forces' efforts to deny their
existence and disavow their findings, journalists, litigants, and scholars have uncovered enormous
amounts of research documenting the Department of Defense's concern with the incidence of
homosexuality within its ranks).
5. Id.
6. Sharon E. Debbage Alexander, A Ban by Any Other Name: Ten Years of "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell," 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 403, 405 (2004) (noting that the prohibition on
sodomy was a criminal prohibition on homosexual conduct, not an administrative prohibition on
service by persons inclined toward same-sex sexual conduct).
7. Id. at 406.
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service regardless of conduct.
Nevertheless, homosexuals continued serving throughout this
period.9 Many served openly.t ° Others kept their sexual orientation a
secret during their service and were never discovered.'" On the other
hand, many were subjected to witch-hunts and investigations, while
others suffered terrible violence.12
Interestingly, a trend emerged that calls into question the rationales
asserted for banning homosexual military service. 13 During this period,
whenever the United States went to war, the armed forces seemed to
loosen the policies barring service by gay, lesbian, and bisexual individ-
uals.' 4 This raised an obvious question: if homosexual soldiers are sup-
posedly weak, are untrustworthy, and weaken unit cohesion, why are
they retained at much higher rates at times in which adequate and trust-
worthy fighters who contribute positively to unit cohesion are most
important to the military?' 5 This contradiction came to the forefront of
the American consciousness in the 1992 presidential elections.' 6
During President Bill Clinton's campaign for the White House, he
promised to lift the ban on open service by gays in the military. 17 Presi-
dent Clinton was motivated partially by the death of Alan Schindler, a
U.S. Navy sailor who was brutally murdered because of his sexual ori-
entation. 18 However, once in office, President Clinton's promise to elim-
inate discrimination based on sexual orientation in the armed forces was
met with unprecedented resistance. 9 As a result, after extensive hear-
ings and debates, a compromise was reached between the President,
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 407 (explaining that many homosexual servicemen and women did not feel a
need to hide their sexual identity where the environment was more relaxed or the military leader
made clear that sexuality was not an issue).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 407-08 (noting a trend toward a decrease in gay discharges when the United
States was at war).
15. Id. at 408.
16. Id.
17. Emily B. Hecht, Debating the Ban: The Past, Present and Future of Don't Ask, Don't
Tell, N.J. LAW., June 2007, at 51, 51.
18. Alexander, supra note 6. at 417. Alan Schindler was a twenty-two-year-old radioman
serving in the United States Navy. Shortly after revealing to his commander that he was a
homosexual, Mr. Schindler was savagely beaten to death. Two fellow servicemen battered Mr.
Schindler against the fixtures of a public toilet, leaving him so badly disfigured that his mother
could identify his body only by the tattoos on his arms. According to the Navy, his head was
crushed, his ribs smashed, and his penis was cut. James Stemgold, Death of a Gay Sailor: A
Lethal Beating Overseas Brings Questions and Fear, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 31, 1993, § I (Magazine),
at 22.
19. Hecht, supra note 17, at 51.
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Congress, and the military. 2° This compromise was the law and accom-
panying regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
known as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue, Don't Harass. '21 The
new law explicitly stated that discharge would no longer be based
merely on homosexual status, but rather on conduct.2 2
The military's rationale for DADT is this: "The presence in the
armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high
standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that
are the essence of military capability. 23 In other words, DADT is neces-
sary to preserve the military's effectiveness as a fighting force and, thus,
to preserve national security.24 However, in the fifteen years since
DADT was enacted and in light of the success of the war in Iraq,25 the
evidence has continued to mount that this policy rationale is
unfounded.26
The legal landscape of DADT changed in 2003 when the Supreme
Court decided Lawrence v. Texas.27 In Lawrence, the Court recognized a
protected liberty interest allowing homosexuals the right to enter into
private consensual relationships and still retain their dignity as free per-
sons.2 8 However, the Court did not declare the level of scrutiny required
for a substantive due process challenge to legislation limiting private
homosexual activity. 29 This lack of clarity has sparked vigorous debate
and criticism. 30 Jurists, scholars, and commentators disagree over the
doctrinal approach to be used in deciding a constitutional challenge to
legislation that infringes on private homosexual conduct.3 ' Some have
interpreted Lawrence to apply rational basis while others see it as a strict
scrutiny opinion.32 Still, others view Lawrence as applying a balancing
of state and individual interests somewhere between rational basis and
20. Id.
21. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006).
22. Hecht, supra note 17, at 51.
23. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15).
24. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 60 (1st Cir. 2008).
25. DEP'T OF DEF., MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ: REPORT TO CONGRESS
(2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010Report-toCongressDecg08.
pdf.
26. See Hecht, supra note 17, at 51.
27. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
28. Id. at 578.
29. See id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30. Kristin Fasullo, Note, Beyond Lawrence v. Texas: Crafting a Fundamental Right to
Sexual Privacy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2997, 3025 (2009).
31. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2008).
32. Id.
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strict scrutiny.33
In 2008, the First and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals were faced
with challenges to the constitutionality of DADT. Both circuits agreed
that Lawrence calls for a heightened level of scrutiny; however, in
applying Lawrence's heightened scrutiny the two courts arrived at
opposing conclusions.34
Part II discusses the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Law-
rence v. Texas. Part III argues that the First Circuit's decision to defer to
Congress on military issues is consistent with the Supreme Court's pre-
cedent, while the Ninth Circuit's decision rests on an unconvincingly
broad reading of Sell v. United States.35 Part IV argues that the policy
rationale for DADT is unfounded in light of the evidence that has arisen
since passage of the act and the Iraq War. Part V argues that regardless
of the level of scrutiny applied to private homosexual conduct, a consti-
tutional challenge to DADT is likely to run into judicial deference on
military affairs and never reach the constitutionality issue. Instead, Con-
gress should repeal DADT. Part VI concludes.
II. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS: OVERRULING BowERs v. HARDWICK
Prior to 2003, rational basis appeared the accepted standard when
reviewing legislation that discriminated based on sexual orientation.36
Under rational basis, the courts of appeals regularly struck down chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of DADT.37 Judicial repudiation of DADT
seemed hopeless until 2003, when the Supreme Court decided Lawrence
v. Texas.38
On September 17, 1998, in Houston, Texas, officers from the Har-
ris County Police Department responded to a weapons disturbance.39
The officers entered an apartment where petitioner John Geddes Law-
33. Id.
34. Compare id. at 60 (dismissing the challenge to DADT on grounds of judicial deference to
Congress in cases arising in a military context), with Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806,
821-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding the substantive due process challenge and holding that, after
Lawrence, a substantive due process challenge must satisfy an intermediate level of scrutiny).
35. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
36. Christopher A. Scott, Cook v. Gates: Don't Ask, Don't Tell Remains a Legal Option for
the Military, but the End May Be in Sight, Case Note, 18 LAW & SEXUALrr 183, 184 (2009).
37. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l
Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg
v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1997); Selland v. Perry, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996); Able v.
United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996).
38. Scott, supra note 36, at 184.
39. Meghan M. Peterson, Case Note, The Right Decision for the Wrong Reason: The Supreme
Court Correctly Invalidates the Texas Homosexual Sodomy Statute, but Rather than Finding an
Equal Protection Violation in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court Incorrectly and Unnecessarily
Overrules Bowers v. Hardwick, 37 CREIGrON L. REv. 653, 655 (2004) (explaining how the
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rence resided.' Once inside, the police observed Lawrence and another
man engaging in a sexual act.4" Both men were arrested and charged
with the crime of "deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a
member of the same sex."42
Procedurally, Lawrence tells a familiar story. Petitioners challenged
the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.43 The court rejected the challenge and petitioners
appealed." The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District
heard petitioners' constitutional arguments. 45 Not surprisingly, the court
of appeals relied on Bowers v. Hardwick46 and rejected the claims.47
Petitioners appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and certiorari
was granted.48
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion.49 Kennedy framed the con-
stitutional issue as "whether petitioners' criminal convictions for adult
consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in
liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause. ' 50 To answer
this question, Kennedy began by tracing the evolution of the Supreme
Court cases recognizing the various due process rights protecting inti-
mate relationships.5
Kennedy started with Griswold v. Connecticut 2 and the Court's
recognition of the right to privacy and protected space of the marital
bedroom. 53 From there, Kennedy explained that in Eisenstadt v. Baird54
police responded to an informant claiming that a man was armed and "going crazy" in Lawrence's
apartment).
40. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003). The right of the police to enter the
apartment was not questioned. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. Lawrence and his partner were accused of breaking section 21.06(a) of the 2003 Texas
Penal Code Annotated. This statute provided that "[a] person commits an offense if he engages in
deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003). The statute defined "[d]eviate sexual intercourse" as follows: "(A) any
contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or
(B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object." Id. § 21.01(1).
43. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
47. Lawrence, 559 U.S. at 563.
48. Id. at 564.
49. Id. at 561.
50. Id. at 564.
51. Id.
52. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (invalidating a state law that prohibited the use of drugs,
medicinal article, or instrument of contraception as well as aiding and abetting the use of
contraceptives).
53. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
54. 405 U.S. 438, 438-39 (1972) (holding that a Massachusetts law prohibiting the
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the Court extended the right to make decisions regarding sexual conduct
beyond the marital relationship.55 Then, in Roe v. Wade,5 6 the Court
identified the right to privacy in relation to a woman's right to have an
abortion.57 Finally, in Carey v. Population Services International,58 the
Court invalidated a law banning sales or distribution of contraceptives to
minors.59 In sum, this line of cases established that "the reasoning of
Griswold could not be confined to the protection of rights of married
adults."6'
After reviewing the precedent establishing and expanding the right
to privacy, Kennedy launched the attack that would end Bowers v. Hard-
wick.6 First, Kennedy criticized Bowers's framing of the central issue as
whether the "Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexu-
als to engage in sodomy."62 In response, Kennedy stated:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual [in Bowers]
put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be
said that marriage is simply about the right to have sexual inter-
course. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes
that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their
penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching conse-
quences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
55. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. Quoting Eisenstadt, Kennedy wrote:
"It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship. . . . If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453).
56. 410 U.S. 113, 151-64 (1973) (recognizing that although limited, under the Due Process
Clause, a woman's right to privacy includes the right terminate her pregnancy).
57. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
58. 431 U.S. 678, 678 (1977) (invalidating, without a single opinion, a law that forbid the sale
of contraceptive devices to persons under sixteen years of age).
59. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566.
60. Id.
61. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. Bowers and Lawrence share
similar facts. A police officer entered Hardwick's bedroom and observed him engaging in intimate
sexual conduct with another man. See id. at 187-88. Hardwick was charged with violating a
Georgia statute prohibiting sodomy. Id. In response, Hardwick brought an action in federal coun
to declare the statute invalid. Id. at 188. Hardwick alleged that he was a practicing homosexual
and the statute violated his fights under the Constitution. Id. The Court, in a five-to-four opinion,
upheld the statute, holding that the Constitution does not confer a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in homosexual sodomy. See id. at 196. Justice White delivered the
majority, joined by Justices Burger, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall dissented.
62. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
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behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do
seek to control a personal relationship that whether or not entitled to
formal recognition in law, is within the liberty of persons to choose.63
Next, Kennedy challenged the Bowers Court's argument that pro-
scriptions against homosexual conduct have "ancient roots."' He
explained that the idea of a "longstanding history in this country of laws
directed at homosexual conduct" is misguided.65 Kennedy finished the
assault on Bowers's historical foundation by noting that it was not until
the "1970's that any State singled out same-sex relations for criminal
prosecution and only nine states have done So.'66
Kennedy did not ignore the Bowers Court's point that for many
centuries "powerful voices" have condemned homosexual conduct as
immoral.67 Instead, he acknowledged the source of this condemnation as
"religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and
traditional family values. '6 8 Nevertheless, Kennedy swiftly dismissed
this argument, explaining that the Supreme Court's "obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not to mandate [its] own moral code."69
Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in Bowers also relied on histori-
cal, religious, and moral condemnation of homosexual conduct.7 0 This
did not escape Kennedy's critique.' In this instant, Kennedy turned to
''our laws and traditions of modem times" for examples of "an emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to
sex." 72 Then, moving past "history and tradition," Kennedy reached
beyond the United States for authorities challenging the soundness of
Burger's concurrence. 3
Kennedy then returned to our own constitutional system in the
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 568.
66. Id. at 570.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 571.
69. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
70. Id. "The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger to the history of Western
civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards did not take account of other
authorities pointing in an opposite direction." Id. at 572.
71. See id. at 572.
72. Id. at 571-72.
73. Id. at 572-73. Kennedy cited a committee advising the British Parliament that
recommended the repeal of laws punishing homosexual conduct. Id. at 572. Moreover, Kennedy
noted that "almost five years before Bowers was decided the European Court of Human Rights"
held that laws proscribing consensual homosexual conduct were invalid under the European
Convention on Human Rights. Id. at 573.
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years following Bowers."4 Kennedy discussed the importance of two
major post-Bowers Supreme Court decisions and how they cast Bowers
into "even more doubt."' 75 Kennedy noted that in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey7 6 the Court confirmed that our laws
and traditions afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relat-
ing to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education.77 And "Bowers would deny [homosexuals] this
right. 78 Next, he discussed how in Romer v. Evans7 9 the Court struck
down class-based legislation directed at homosexuals.8 ° In that case, the
Court found that an amendment to Colorado's constitution that deprived
homosexuals of protection under the State's antidiscrimination laws was
"born of animosity toward the class of persons affected" and was not
rationally related to any legitimate governmental purpose.8"
Finally, after a brief discussion about the heavy stigma that attaches
to a person convicted under the Texas law, 82 Kennedy signed Bowers's
death sentence with a quote from Justice Stevens's dissent in that same
case.
"Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the
fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding
a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save
a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second,
individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of
their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce off-
spring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to inti-
mate choices by unmarried as well as married persons."83
On that note, Kennedy declared that Bowers was overruled.84
74. Id. at 573.
75. Id.
76. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
78. Id. at 574.
79. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In Romer, the Court invalidated an amendment to Colorado's
Constitution because it deprived homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexuals either by orientation,
conduct, practices or relationship, of their protection under state antidiscrimination laws. Id. at
624. The Romer Court concluded that the proposed amendment was "born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected." Id. at 634.
80. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
81. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
82. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.
83. Id. at 577-78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558).
84. See id. at 578 ("Bowers was not correct when it was decided and it is not correct today. It
ought not to remain binding precedent.").
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III. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE: FIRST AND NINTH CIRCUITS
Go THEIR SEPARATE WAYS
A. Cook v. Gates
1. BACKGROUND AND THE DISTRICT COURT
In Cook v. Gates, Plaintiffs were twelve highly decorated gay, les-
bian, or bisexual citizens who served in the U.S. military.85 They served
honorably in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other parts of the world in
support of American military operations.86 All served during the war on
terrorism; many have devoted their entire adult lives to military ser-
vice.87 Nonetheless, each Plaintiff was discharged between 2002 and
2004 under DADT.88
Plaintiffs filed action on December 6, 2004, challenging DADT as
unconstitutional.89 They argued that DADT violates their right to sub-
stantive due process on its face and as applied, that it denies the Plain-
tiffs equal protection of the law on the basis of sexual orientation, and
that the portion of the act that forces discharge based on a member's
statement that he or she is a homosexual violates freedom of speech.90
The Government moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). 91 Furthermore, the government argued that Plain-
tiffs' due process and equal protection claims failed because DADT was
subject to rational basis review and the Government's "unit cohesion
argument" sufficed to sustain the law under this standard.92
The district court granted the Government's motion to dismiss.93
First, the district court determined that the Supreme Court applied the
rational basis standard in Lawrence and therefore did not alter the appli-
cability of the rational basis review applied in pre-Lawrence chal-
lenges.94 Next, the district court agreed that the "unit cohesion
85. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008) (No. 06-
2313).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Cook, 528 F.3d at 47.
91. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 85, at 5.
92. Cook, 528 F.3d at 47. As noted earlier, the government's "unit cohesion" argument is that
"[t]he presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order
and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability." 10 U.S.C.
§ 654(a)(15) (2006).
93. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 85, at 5.
94. Cook, 528 F.3d at 47-48. The district court noted that Plaintiff's liberty interest in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex was not "fundamental."
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 85, at 5.
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argument" set forth a rational reason for DADT.95 As a result, the Due
Process Clause challenge failed and Plaintiffs appealed to the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.96
2. THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
On appeal, Plaintiffs alleged that the district court misread Law-
rence.97 They argued the district court erred by discounting Lawrence as
an ordinary rational basis case that did not change the law.98 Instead,
Plaintiffs argued that, by overturning Bowers, Lawrence made clear
"that all adults, regardless of their sexual orientation, possess a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in determining how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex."99 Moreover, Plaintiffs argued
that Lawrence "evince[d] a clear concern. .. with the equal legal dignity
to which gay persons are constitutionally entitled."'" Finally, Plaintiffs
concluded that "together with Romer v. Evans, Lawrence means that
government may not demean the lives of gay persons by enacting laws
that infringe on their fundamental liberties or treat them as a separate,
secondary class." 10'
The First Circuit rejected the district court's reading of Law-
rence.12 Instead, the First Circuit held that Lawrence "recognized a lib-
erty interest for adults to engage in private, consensual sexual intimacy
and applied a balancing of constitutional interests" that falls somewhere
in between strict scrutiny and rational basis. 10 3 Subsequently, the First
Circuit noted that this case arose in a "unique" context-that of congres-
sional judgment in the area of military affairs. 1" Therefore, the First
Circuit applied a deferential approach and concluded, "[W]here Con-
gress has articulated a substantial government interest for a law, and
where the challenges in question implicate that interest, judicial intru-
sion is simply not warranted."'0 5
Unfortunately, the First Circuit's deference to Congress leaves a
constitutionally dubious law outside the reach of constitutional chal-
lenges. As unfortunate as this result may be, the First Circuit's decision
95. Cook, 528 F.3d at 48.
96. Id.
97. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 85, at 14.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 15.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 57.
105. Id. at 60.
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to defer is grounded on the solid precedent calling for judicial deference
on military matters.
3. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE ON MILITARY MATTERS
After the end of the Vietnam-era military draft, the Supreme Court
decided a series of cases that "constructed a doctrine of constitutional
separatism that shields military related decisions from the usual scrutiny
of judicial review."' 06 In 1974 the Supreme Court decided Parker v.
Levy.'O7 In that case, the Court upheld the conviction of an Army physi-
cian who had refused an order to conduct dermatology training for Spe-
cial Forces personnel and encouraged enlisted personnel to resist combat
duty in Vietnam."°8 The Court held that the military had "been a society
apart from civilian society, so '[m]ilitary law .. .is a jurisprudence
which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our fed-
eral judicial establishment.""' As a result, the Court established the
foundation for the new doctrine of judicial deference in cases arising in a
military context that was based on the concept of separatism between the
military and civilian worlds."
Then, in 1980, the Court decided Rostker v. Goldberg.' In an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court relied on the deference
doctrine to uphold Congress's decision to bar women from registration
for the selective service. 112 In this case, the Solicitor General argued that
the Court should have relied on the deference doctrine to review Con-
gress's decision under rational basis, rather than the heightened scrutiny
with which the Court approached gender based discrimination. 1 3 Rehn-
quist rejected this argument." 4 He explained that refining the applicable
tests would do nothing to advance the substantive guarantee of due pro-
cess.' Instead, Rehnquist endorsed a unitary standard of deference to
106. Diane H. Mazur, Is" Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Unconstitutional After Lawrence? What Will
It Take To Overturn the Policy, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 423, 431 (2004).
107. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
108. Id. at 737.
109. Id. at 744 (alterations in original) (quoting Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1974)).
110. Mazur, supra note 106, at 428.
111. 453 U.S. 57 (1980).
112. Id. at 60.
"[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts
have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially
professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative
and Executive Branches."
Id. at 65-66 (alteration in original) (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)).
113. Id. at 69.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 69-70.
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be applied in all cases involving Congress's choices about military pol-
icy.' 16 He feared that "degrees of 'deference' to legislative judgments[,]
...which this Court announces that it applies to particular classifica-
tions made by a legislative body, may all too readily become facile
abstractions used to justify a result."' 1 7 On that note, the Court applied
heightened scrutiny review to the government's gender based decision.
Rehnquist noted that "no one could deny that ...the Government's
interest in raising and supporting armies is an 'important governmental
interest,' 1"8 that the military is a unique environment "governed by
separate discipline from that of the civilian,""' 9 and that, in the military
context, "Congress is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth
and with greater flexibility."'' 20 Finally, Rehnquist reiterated that "judi-
cial deference ... is at its apogee when legislative action under the
congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and
regulations for their governance is challenged."' 2'
Lastly, in 1986, in Goldman v. Weinberger, the Court upheld the
military's punishment of an orthodox Jew for wearing a yarmulke
indoors while in uniform. 122 In that case, the Court repeated that "the
military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian
society"' 23 and that "judicial deference... is at its apogee" when decid-
ing issues in the context of military affairs. 24
On the other hand, this doctrine has been heavily criticized. 25 Pro-
fessor Diane Mazur criticized the Court's deferential stance on military
matters as well as the legal academy's failure to challenge the constitu-
tionality of this doctrine. 26 She argues that the deference doctrine, as
espoused in Rostker, is treated as longstanding and beyond question. 127
Indeed, as Mazur asserts, the facts of Rostker are "completely obsolete
116. See Ellen Oberwetter, Note, Rethinking Military Deference: Male-Only Draft Registration
and the Intersection of Military Need with Civilian Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 173, 184 (1999)
(arguing that Rehnquist's reluctance to distinguish between degrees of deference in the military
context amounts to a "unitary standard of deference" even though the Court never used that
specific phrase).
117. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 69-70.
118. Id. at 70.
119. Id. at 71.
120. Id. at 66 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974)).
121. Id. at 69.
122. 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986).
123. Id. at 506 (quoting Parker, 417 U.S. at 743).
124. Id. at 508 (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70).
125. See id.; C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and
Other "Special Contexts," 56 U. CQN. L. REV. 779, 827-43 (1988).
126. Mazur, supra note 106, at 440.
127. Harvard Law School Lambda Second Annual Gay and Lesbian Legal Advocacy
Conference: "Don't Ask Don't Tell," 14 Duic J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1173, 1238 (2007)
[hereinafter Harvard Law School Lambda].
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today."' 128 Since Rostker, Congress has repealed the federal statutes that
barred women from combat service, and today, in the Army and Marine
Corps, "a majority of positions can be filled by women."' 29 Finally, Pro-
fessor Mazur maintains "it would be very difficult for a court today to
rule, as Rostker did, that women would be of little use to the military in
time of war." 3'
Furthermore, Professor Mazur argues that much of the law upon
which Rostker relies is also obsolete. She explains how the Court in
United States v. Virginia held that "classifications on the basis of sex
must be supported by an exceedingly persuasive justification."'31 There-
fore, she claims "it would be very difficult for a court today to slide by,
as did Rostker, an enhanced standard of scrutiny in an equal protection
case." 132 In other words, the only thing that survives from Rostker is the
statement about judicial deference in matters concerning the military,
and these "platitudes" from Rostker have been completely divorced from
the facts and the law. 133
Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that the current Supreme
Court is ready to change course on the issue of judicial deference in the
military context. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc., the Roberts Court was faced with a constitutional challenge
to the Solomon Amendments, which required the denial of federal fund-
ing to institutions of higher education that prohibited military represent-
atives access to and assistance for recruiting purposes. 134 In a unanimous
opinion, the Court denied the challenge. 35 Chief Justice Roberts began
the substantive analysis by stating, "Congress' power in this area 'isbroad and sweeping. ' '136 Chief Justice Roberts then cited the all too
familiar language from Rostker-" 'judicial deference . . . is at its apo-
gee' when Congress legislates under its authority to raise and support
armies."' 37 From this point forward, Chief Justice Roberts does not refer
to the deference doctrine. However, this language signified that the opin-
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 518 U.S. 515, 530 (1996).
132. Harvard Law School Lambda, supra note 127, at 1238.
133. Id. Professor Mazur goes on to argue that the problem is that courts continue to follow the
culture of Rostker more than the law of Rostker. Id. at 1239. She argues that judicial deference to
the military is a cultural phenomenon as opposed to a legal one. Id. This makes it much more
difficult to displace. Id. In other words, Rostker is an "accurate statement about the way we view
the military. It's not an accurate statement about judicial deference or about constitutional
structure or about anything else." Id. at 1239.
134. 547 U.S. 47, 52 (2006).
135. Id. at 47.
136. Id. at 58 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
137. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1980)).
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ion would "proceed in the shadow of the military deference doctrine."' 38
In conclusion, in Cook, the First Circuit's reliance on the deference
doctrine is grounded on substantial Supreme Court precedent. Even
though this doctrine has been heavily criticized and essentially leaves
DADT outside the reach of constitutional challenges, the likelihood that
the Supreme Court will change course on this doctrine is very small.
B. Witt v. Department of the Air Force
Major Witt was an Air Force reservist nurse who was separated
from the armed services, pursuant to DADT, because of her sexual rela-
tionship with another woman. 3 9 During her service, Major Witt never
told any member of the military that she was a homosexual. 4 ' Neverthe-
less, she was in a long-term relationship with a civilian woman with
whom she shared a residence located some 250 miles away from her Air
Force base.' 4 ' Major Witt served in the armed forces for almost twenty
years prior to her separation. 42 By all accounts, she was highly deco-
rated, having received numerous awards and medals.' 43 Major Witt filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington, arguing that DADT violated her substantive due process
rights. "
Like the First Circuit in Cook, the Ninth Circuit held that Lawrence
required "something more than traditional rational basis review."' 45 The
Ninth Circuit noted that strict scrutiny would be inappropriate because in
Lawrence the Court did not discuss narrow tailoring or a compelling
state interest. 146 In other words, Lawrence called for a "heightened level
of scrutiny." '47
Here is where the First and Ninth Circuits diverge. Whereas the
First Circuit held that deference in the military context should govern
the challenge to DADT, the Ninth Circuit held that a substantive due
process challenge could go forward under Sell."' The Ninth Circuit
noted that Sell was a "recent Supreme Court case that applied a height-
ened level of scrutiny to a substantive due process claim" resembling the
138. Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1109 (2008).
139. Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 2008).
140. Id. at 810.
141. Id. at 809.
142. Id. at 810.
143. Id. at 809.
144. Id. at 810-11. Major Witt also argued that DADT violated Equal Protection and
procedural due process. See id.
145. Id. at 813.
146. Id. at 817.
147. Id. at 816.
148. Id. at 818 (citing Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003)).
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scrutiny and analysis performed in Lawrence.4 9
In Sell, petitioner Charles Sell was a dentist with a long history of
mental illness. 5 ' Between 1997 and 1998, Sell was charged with com-
mitting multiple crimes and underwent several hospitalizations and psy-
chiatric evaluations.' 5 ' In 1999, he was examined and deemed "mentally
incompetent to stand trial."' 52 Sell was hospitalized to determine
whether he would attain competency to stand trial. 53 Two months later,
the Medical Staff recommended that Sell take antipsychotic medication.
He refused. The Medical Staff sought permission to administer medica-
tion against Sell's will and that request became the subject of the
proceedings. '54
The Sell Court considered whether the Constitution permitted the
government to forcibly administer antipsychotic medications in order to
render Sell competent to stand trial."' The Court noted the defendant's
"significant constitutionally" protected liberty interest and held that the
drugs could be administered "only if the treatment is medically appropri-
ate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the
fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is
necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related
interests." 5 6
The Ninth Circuit recognized that Sell's holding was specific to the
context of forcibly administering medication.'57 However, the circuit
court found support in their own circuit's decision of Miller v. Gam-
mie,158 where, according to the Witt court, it held that the court "is
bound by the theory or reasoning underlying a Supreme Court case, not
just by its holding."' 159 As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that Sell
applies "equally here" and adopted the first three parts of the Sell test
"as the heightened scrutiny balancing required under Lawrence."'' 60 In
149. Id.
150. Sell, 539 U.S. at 169. In 1982, Sell was hospitalized after telling doctors that the gold he
used for fillings had been contaminated by Communists. Id. Sell was hospitalized again in 1984
after calling the police to report that a leopard was outside his office boarding a bus. Id. at 169-70.
"On various occasions, [Sell] complained that public officials ... were trying to kill him." Id. at
170. In 1997, he told law enforcement that he spoke to God and that God told him to kill FBI
persons. Id. at 169-70.
151. Id. at 170-71.
152. Id. at 171.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 169.
156. Id. at 178-80.
157. Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 818 (9th Cir. 2008).
158. 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003).
159. 527 F.3d at 818.
160. Id. at 819.
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conclusion, the Ninth Circuit held that,
when the government attempts to intrude upon the personal and pri-
vate lives of homosexuals, in a manner that implicates the rights iden-
tified in Lawrence, the government must advance an important
governmental interest, the intrusion must significantly further that
interest, and the intrusion must be necessary to further that
interest. 161
C. Ninth Circuit's Reliance on Sell and Lawrence
The central premise in Sell was the "administ[ration of] antip-
sychotic drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal defendant,' 62
while Witt dealt with the right of private homosexual conduct in a mili-
tary context. 63 The Witt court explained that the connection between
Sell and Witt was that Sell was "another recent Supreme Court case that
applied a heightened level of scrutiny to a substantive due process
claim-a scrutiny that resembles and expands upon the analysis per-
formed in Lawrence."'1 64 By linking Witt and Lawrence via Sell's
"heightened level of scrutiny that resembles and expands upon the anal-
ysis in Lawrence,"'165 the Witt court ignored the significant and different
considerations espoused in each of those cases.
Whereas Lawrence focused entirely on considerations and cases
dealing with privacy and sexual conduct, Sell focused on issues and
cases dealing specifically with forced medication. 66 For example, the
Lawrence Court discussed at length the evolution of the doctrine defin-
ing and expanding the right to privacy. Furthermore, the Lawrence Court
specifically discussed the historical significance of laws directed at
homosexual conduct 167 and the "policy of punishing consenting adults
for private acts."'6 8 Finally, the Lawrence Court noted that laws
criminalizing homosexual conduct "subject homosexual persons to dis-
crimination both in public and private spheres."'' 69 In other words, the
161. Id.
162. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
163. See Witt, 527 F.3d at 809.
164. Id. at 818.
165. Id.
166. For example, the Sell Court relied on Washington v. Harper, which recognized that an
individual "possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs," 494 U.S. 201, 221 (1990), and Riggins v. Nevada, which held that it was
error to order that the defendant be administered antipsychotic drugs during the course of a trial
over his objection without findings that there were no less intrusive alternatives, that the
medication was medically appropriate, and that it was essential for the sake of defendant's safety
or the safety of others, 504 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1992).
167. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568-71 (2003).
168. Id. at 570 (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 575.
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Court was concerned with the stigmatizing effects these laws have on
homosexuals as a group. These considerations clearly show that the cen-
tral issue in Lawrence was private homosexual conduct. Nothing in
Lawrence indicated that the Supreme Court envisioned that its holding
would be applied in such a different context, as in forced medication.
On the other hand, in arriving at its conclusion, the Sell Court con-
sidered several issues specific to the forced administration of antip-
sychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious charges. First,
the Court noted the "government's interest in bringing to trial an indi-
vidual accused of a crime"' 7° and the "human need for security."' 71
Next, the Sell Court discussed the special circumstances that must be
considered when forcibly administering medication: how a defendant's
failure to take drugs can lead to lengthy confinements in an institution,
the longer a defendant is institutionalized the more likely he is to forget
key evidence, the government's interest in timely prosecution, and other
"fair trial" considerations. 72 Finally, the Court noted that the involun-
tary medication must be in the "patient's best medical interest in light of
his medical conditions"' 73 and that the specific kinds of drugs are rele-
vant to the decision.' 74 These considerations indicate that the central
issue in Sell was indeed forced administration of antipsychotic drugs. In
other words, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court considered that the
holding in Sell would be applied to a situation as factually distinguisha-
ble from Sell as the substantive due process challenge in Witt.
Furthermore, the Sell Court clearly confined its holding to the spe-
cific facts presented in that case. The first prong of the Sell test involved
identifying an "important governmental interest" and that "courts must
consider the facts of the individual case in evaluating the Government's
interest in prosecution." 175 However, the Ninth Circuit, in applying Sell,
disregarded the "in prosecution" part of the holding. Instead, the Ninth
Circuit noted that courts "must consider the facts of the individual case
in evaluating the government interest."' 76 This is problematic for two
reasons.
First, it ignores the Supreme Court's clear effort to contain the Sell
holding within the facts presented in that case, that is, involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs. In arriving at its conclusion, the
170. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 181.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 180-81 (emphasis added).
176. Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 820 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Sell Court relied on two cases, Washington v. Harper177 and Riggins v.
Nevada.78 Both Harper and Riggins dealt specifically with the issue of
forced administration of antipsychotic drugs. 79 Nowhere in Sell does
the Court mention the possibility that its reasoning or rationale should,
or could, be applied outside the context of forced administration of med-
ication. In addition, Justice Breyer's statement of Sell's holding further
suggests how narrowly the Court intended the case to be read-Breyer
stated, "We conclude that the Constitution allows the Government to
administer those drugs ... in limited circumstances."'80 Finally, Breyer
noted, "We emphasize that the court applying these standards is seeking
to determine whether involuntary administration of drugs is necessary
significantly to further a particular governmental interest, namely, the
interest in rendering the defendant competent to stand trial.' 8'
Second, by asserting that the court is bound by a decision's reason-
ing and not its holding, the Ninth Circuit presupposes that the Supreme
Court considered how the rationale and reasoning involved in such deci-
sions will be applied in every conceivable scenario. This is clearly not
the case. As stated earlier, in both Lawrence and Sell, the Court
addressed very specific, and different, issues and rested its decision on
considerations specific to those cases.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Witt amounts to a defeat for oppo-
nents of DADT. By taking Sell out of the context of forced administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs and applying it to private homosexual
conduct in the military, the Ninth Circuit wrote an opinion that is alto-
gether unconvincing. If the Supreme Court takes the case and overrules
it, the Ninth Circuit will have done more harm than good to the cause of
equality for homosexuals by providing their opponents on the Court
with such an easy out.
D. Ninth and First Circuit's Divergence on
Deference in Military Context
Where the First Circuit presented a strong and thorough case for
deference to Congress in the area of military affairs, 82 the Ninth Circuit
dismissed the issue with a mere four sentences, suggesting a weakness
that could prove fatal if the Supreme Court decides to resolve this
conflict. 183
177. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
178. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
179. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 129; Harper, 494 U.S. at 213.
180. Sell, 539 U.S. at 169 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 181 (first emphasis added).
182. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 58-61 (1st Cir. 2008).
183. Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 821 (9th Cir. 2008).
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The First Circuit began its case for judicial deference by recogniz-
ing the "unique context in which the liberty interest at stake" arose.' 84
The First Circuit cited Loving v. United States,'85 noting that the
Supreme Court gives "highest deference" in military affairs."8 6 Then, the
court noted Weiss v. United States,'8 7 where the Supreme Court stated
its adherence to deference where the "constitutional rights of servicemen
[are] implicated." '188 Finally, the court looked to Rostker v. Goldberg8 9
noting that "judicial deference ... is at its apogee" in cases dealing with
Congress's authority to raise and support armies.' 9°
The First Circuit then engaged in a thorough and comprehensive
analysis of the reasoning behind judicial deference in a military con-
text-the case for institutional competence and Congress's power to
raise and support armies. First, the court noted that military matters is an
area where courts have little competence and the "complex, subtle, and
professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping and
control of a military force are essentially professional military judg-
ments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Execu-
tive Branches."'' Second, the First Circuit pointed to North Dakota v.
United States, 92 noting that, when questions arise in a military context,
the Court "properly defer[s] to the judgment of those who must lead our
Armed Forces in battle."' 93 Third, the First Circuit looked to United
States v. O'Brien19 4 in support for deference to Congress's power to
"raise and support armies and make all laws necessary to that end." '
Then, the court explained that this power is "broad and sweeping" and
how the Supreme Court previously maintained Congress's "responsibil-
ity for 'the delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the
needs of the military.' "196 Finally, the First Circuit cited Rostker v.
Goldberg,97 declaring that the district court undertook "an independent
evaluation of evidence rather than adopting a[ ] ... deferential examina-
tion of Congress' evaluation of the evidence."' 98 In the end, the First
184. Cook, 528 F.3d at 57.
185. 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
186. Cook, 528 F.3d at 57.
187. 510 U.S. 163 (1994).
188. Cook, 528 F.3d at 57 (alteration in original) (quoting Weiss, 510 U.S. at 177).
189. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
190. Cook, 528 F.3d at 57 (alteration in original) (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70).
191. Id. (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)).
192. 495 U.S. 423 (1990).
193. Cook, 528 F.3d at 57 (alteration in original) (quoting North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 443).
194. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
195. Cook, 528 F.3d at 57 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
196. Id. (quoting Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447 (1987)).
197. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
198. Cook, 528 F.3d at 58 (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 82-83).
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Circuit cited thirteen different cases in support for the argument that
courts should defer to Congress in military context.
On the other hand, although the Ninth Circuit recognized that "judi-
cial deference to ... congressional exercise of authority is at its apogee
when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and
support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is
challenged,"' 99 the court quickly dismissed the issue by noting that "def-
erence does not mean abdication"'" and that "Congress ... is subject to
the requirements of the Due Process Clause when legislating in the area
of military affairs."' 0'
The Ninth Circuit's dismissive treatment of the precedent calling
for judicial deference is problematic because it leaves the opinion vul-
nerable to attack. As the First Circuit's opinion clearly shows, the prece-
dent for judicial deference is longstanding. In other words, if the
Supreme Court chooses to hear this case, it is likely that the Justices
would engage in a more thorough analysis of its own precedent for judi-
cial deference, an analysis akin to the one performed by the First Circuit
and likely to arrive at the same conclusion.
IV. THE MILITARY'S WANING RATIONALE FOR DADT
When DADT was passed, the military espoused the following ratio-
nale in support of keeping homosexuals from openly serving in the mili-
tary: "The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unac-
ceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and discipline,
and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability. 20 2 How-
ever, in the fifteen years since DADT was enacted and in light of the
success of the war in Iraq,2 °3 the evidence has continued to mount that
this policy rationale is unfounded. The evidence includes growing sup-
port among the public and military personnel for open homosexual ser-
vice, the military's reluctance to enforce DADT in times of conflict, the
pressure on the military to lower recruitment standards to meet person-
nel needs and the continued strain on the armed forces as a result of
personnel shortages, the increased costs of enforcing DADT, and the
military's own assessment of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in light of
199. Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 821 (9th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original)
(quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70).
200. Id. (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70).
201. Id. (quoting Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176 (1994)).
202. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (2006).
203. See generally DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 25 (discussing Iraq).
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the fact that the U.S. military currently serves alongside allied forces
that allow open homosexual service.
First, in a July 2008 ABC poll of a random sample of the American
public, three-quarters of respondents said they "support allowing gays to
serve in the military, whether they 'tell' or not. ' 2°4 This is a much
broader support than existed when the DADT was put in place, and this
number has been steadily rising.20 5 In 1993, when DADT was passed,
fewer than forty-four percent believed that homosexuals should be
allowed to serve; by 2001 this number had risen to sixty-two percent.20 6
Second, in a 2006 Zogby poll, seventy-three percent of military ser-
vicemen and women surveyed said that they are comfortable serving
alongside gays and lesbians, while twenty-three percent reported that
they already serve with someone known to be gay. 07 In addition, a
recent study conducted by four retired military officers and released by
the Palm Center found that "evidence shows that allowing gays and les-
bians to serve openly is unlikely to pose any significant risk to morale,
good order, discipline or cohesion. ' 20 8 To support its conclusion, the
study referred to the British and Israeli militaries where homosexuals
currently serve openly "without hurting the effectiveness of combat
operations. 2 °9 Moreover, American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are
currently serving alongside allied forces from twenty-two different
countries that currently allow open service by gays and lesbians.2 10 As a
matter of fact, among the twenty-five countries that participate militarily
in NATO, more than twenty allow gays and lesbians to serve.2 '
Third, there is mounting evidence that military commanders are not
enforcing DADT and, as a result of severe personnel shortages, are
allowing or requiring openly gay service members to finish their
204. Emily B. Guskin, Attitudes Toward "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy Radically Change,
ABCNEWS.COM, July 19, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=5387980.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Hecht, supra note 17, at 55.
208. Anne Flaherty, Study: Military's Gays Don't Hurt Unit, CHARLESTON DAILY MAL, July
8, 2008, at 3A.
209. Id.
210. The following twenty-two Allied Countries with troops in Iraq and Afghanistan allow
gays to serve: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. See SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEF.
NETWORK, FOREIGN MILITARIES WHICH ALLOW OPEN SERVICE (2007), available at http://sldn.
3cdn.net/877fa9ce3ef2a2b2bc-wrm6bngt7.pdf.
211. See Jamie Reno, Beginning the Conversation: Fifteen Years After the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" Policy Was Enacted for the U.S. Military, Congress Is Prepping To Review the Law,
NEWSWEEK.COM, July 21, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/147961/page/l.
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terms.2 12 In 2005, a group of researchers studying military personnel
policy discovered a regulation halting the discharge of gay soldiers
about to be mobilized.213 The regulation states that, if discharge for
homosexual conduct is requested subsequent to the "unit's receipt of
alert notification, discharge isn't authorized. Member will enter AD
(active duty) with the unit. '21 4 This not only runs contrary to the Penta-
gon's assertion that the military would never send gays to war and dis-
charge them when the conflict ends,2 5  but also undermines the
military's "most aggressive argument in opposition to open homosexual
service."2 6
Fourth, while the military is busy discharging two homosexual ser-
vice members each day,217 they have simultaneously been loosening
recruitment standards to "expand its diminishing pool of recruits. '218 For
example, the Army has offered larger enlistment cash bonuses, allowed
more high school dropouts and applicants with low scores on its aptitude
test, as well as loosened weight and age restrictions.2 19 Furthermore,
according to data released in 2008 by the House Committee, the Army
and Marine Corps increased the number of felons recruited into their
ranks, raising questions about the "military's ability to attract quality
recruits at a time when it is trying to increase enlistment.2 20 This is a
particularly disturbing trend. At a time when the military is most
strained, it continues to separate qualified service members, many of
who are highly decorated and distinguished, simply because of their sex-
ual orientation.221
212. Robert I. Correales, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: A Dying Policy on the Precipice, 44 CAL. W.
L. REv. 413, 431 (2008).
213. Michael D. Palm Ctr., Regulations Seem To Contradict Pentagon Denial that Military
Retains Gays During War, PALMCENTER.ORG, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.palmcenter.org/press/
dadt/releases/researcherslocate-army-document orderingcommanders nottofire-gays.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Correales, supra note 212, at 430.
217. Hecht, supra note 17, at 55.
218. Lizette Alvarez, Army Giving More Waivers in Recruiting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at
Al.
219. Id.
220. Lizette Alvarez, Army and Marine Corps Grant More Felony Waivers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
22, 2008, at A21.
221. Some of the plaintiffs in Cook v. Gates included: Thomas Cook, attained the rank of
Specialist (E-4) with an Intelligence specialty and was the recipient of the Army Achievement
Medal; Megan Dresch, attained the rank of Private Second Class (E-2) with a Military Police
specialty and was the recipient of the National Defense Service Medal and the Army Service
Ribbon; Dr. Laura Galaburda, attained the rank of Second Lieutenant (0-1) and was a resident
physician with training specializing in family medicine; Jack Glover, attained the positions of
Flight Adjutant, General Military Corps Advisor, Operations Group Commander with the rank of
Cadet Lieutenant Colonel, and Cadet Lieutenant Colonel as Group Commander; David Hall,
attained the rank of Staff Sargeant (E-5) with an Aircraft Armament Systems specialty and was
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Fifth, implementation of DADT has come with an enormous finan-
cial cost. In a 2005 study, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
reported that between 1994 and 2003 the average annual cost to recruit
new service members was $10,500 per person.222 During this same time
period, 9352 gay service members were discharged.2 3 Therefore, the
total cost to train new recruits to replace these service members was
estimated at $95 million.224 However, these figures did not include the
cost of "investigation, counseling/pastoral service for discharged mem-
bers, separation procedures, the cost of review board operations and the
cost of defending legal challenges to the policy.1 22 5 It is likely that the
total cost is much higher. In fact, a study conducted by the University of
Santa Barbara estimated the total cost of DADT approximates $360
million.226
Perhaps the most damning evidence against the military's rationale
for DADT is the military's own assessment of its performance in the
Iraq War. In the September 2008 Report to Congress, the military
reported that the "overall security situation in Iraq has continued to
improve. 227 In other words, if, at this moment, there are openly gay
men and women serving in the armed forces while commanders and
colleagues are aware of their sexual orientation and these soldiers are
not being separated because of a shortage of personnel, and on top of
the recipient of the Air Force Achievement Medal, the Air Force Commendation medal, the Air
Force Longevity Service Award, the Air Force Training Ribbon, the NCO Professional Military
Education Ribbon, the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, the Air Force Outstanding Unit Ward,
and the Air Force Good Conduct Medal; Jenny Lynn Kopfstein, attained the rank of Lieutenant
Junior Grade (0-2) and was the recipient of the Navy Achievement Medal, the Meritorious Unit
Commendation, the Battle "E" Ribbon, the National Defense Service Medal, the Armed Forces
Expeditionary Medal, the Sea Service Deployment Ribbon, the Navy Expert Rifle Medal, the
Navy Expert Pistol Shot Medal, and the Surface Warfare Qualification Breast Insignia; Justin
Peacock, recipient of the Coast Guard Unit Commendation Award, the Coast Guard Meritorious
Commendation, and the National Defense Service Medal; Derek Sparks, attained the rank of Petty
officer First Class and was the recipient of Sailor of the Quarter Award, four Sea Service Ribbons,
the COMCARGRU with one letter of commendation, the National Defense Service Medal, the
SW Asia Service medal, a Navy Unit Commendation, the Navy Expert Pistol Medal, the Navy
Battle "E" Ribbon, the Kuwait Liberation Medal; three Navy and Marine Corps Achievement
Medals, four Navy Good Conduct Awards; a Meritorious Unit Commendation Citation, and the
Navy Expert Rifle Medal; Stacy Vasquez, attained the rank of Sergeant First Class (E-7) and was
the recipient of the Army Commendation Medal, the Army Achievement Medal, the Army Good
Conduct Medals, the National Defense Service Medals, the Armed Forces Reserve Medal with
"M" device, NCO Professional Development, Sergeant Audie Murphy Club Member, U.S. Army
Gold Recruiter Badge with 3 Sapphire Achievement Stars, and the U.S. Army Basic Recruiter
Badge with 3 Gold Achievement Stars.
222. Correales, supra note 212, at 431.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Hecht, supra note 17, at 55.
227. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 25, at iii.
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this we are "winning" the war,22 8 then the "presence in the armed forces
of persons who demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual acts"
is not "creat[ing] an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale,
good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of mili-
tary capability." '229
V. CONGRESS'S TURN To ACT
Justice Kennedy, as judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
said, "[O]ne does not surrender his or her constitutional rights upon
entering the military, but the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
constitutional rights must be viewed in light of special circumstances
and needs of the armed forces."230 Moreover, some courts find a "consti-
tutionally mandated deference to military assessments and judgments
[that] gives the judiciary far less scope to scrutinize the reasons ... that
the military has advanced to justify its actions. '231 The two main argu-
ments in favor of deferring to Congress on matters involving the military
are that the judicial system lacks the competence necessary in this area
and, as a separation of powers matter, military policies should be left to
the legislative and executive branches.232 On the other hand, some other
courts give less deference to the government when fundamental rights
are involved.2 33
The two principal arguments in favor of deference are based on five
underlying doctrines that apply to the DADT policy. 234 In a 2007 panel
228. Nationwide research in August 2008 indicates that 68% of Iraqis believe that the
Iraqi Army is winning the battle against terrorists and that 58% of Iraqis believe the
Iraqi Police Force are winning the battle against crime. This is a 16-percentage point
increase in perception for the Iraqi Army and a [sic] eight-percentage point increase
in perception for the Iraqi Police since November 2007.
DEP'T OF DEF., MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ: REPORT TO CONGRESS 29 (2008)
(footnote omitted), available at www.defenselink.mil/news/d2008O930iraq.pdf.
229. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (2006).
230. Pamela Glazner, Comment, Constitutional Law Doctrine Meets Reality: Don't Ask, Don't
Tell in Light of Lawrence v. Texas, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv 635, 651 (2006) (quoting Beller v.
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 1980)).
231. Id. at 652.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 950 (4th Cir. 1997) (Hall, J., dissenting)
("[W]hile I will defer, as I ought and must, to the professional judgment of military commanders
on things military, I may never defer to their judgment on things constitutional.").
234. Harvard Law School Lambda, supra note 127, at 1232.
Tim Bakken is a Professor of Law at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and a
visiting scholar at the Columbia University School of Law and New York Law
School. Prof. Bakken has helped develop legal programs in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Russia, and Afghanistan, from where he returned last week after
working to create a department of law for the National Military Academy of
Afghanistan.
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discussion at Harvard University, Professor Tim Bakken outlined these
five doctrines:
First, Article I of the Constitution provides express authority to Con-
gress to call, regulate, and discipline the armed forces. Article II
makes the President the Commander-in-Chief. Second, under the
doctrine established in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, the gov-
ernment's authority is at its zenith when Congress and the President
agree on a matter, such as the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Third,
in the statute establishing the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy...
Congress made findings of fact based on congressional hearings.
Fourth, the military has supported the policy. Fifth, in assessing the
policy, the Court will question only whether there is any conceivable
basis for the policy.235
Next, Professor Bakken presented a hypothetical illustrating these doc-
trines. Suppose a military contractor claimed he was discriminated by
the military because the military chose a competitor's helicopters rather
than his fixed-wing airplanes for combat operations.236 The contractor
introduces evidence that his aircraft is better than the chosen helicop-
ters.237 As a result, the judge sides with the contractor and orders the
military to use fixed-wing planes "despite congressional findings, Presi-
dential concurrence with Congress, and the testimony from the leaders
of the military to the contrary. 238
The judge's decision in Professor Bakken's hypothetical would be
suspect because of the limitations of official hearings. 239 "No witness,
video, or evidence could convey in a courtroom the reality and horror of
combat. ' 240 Furthermore, a judge's orders could not provide for the type
of adjustments needed in combat. More importantly, Professor Bakken
noted that, from a constitutional standpoint, the judge's conclusions
would contravene Congress's findings and that
the judge's order to use a different aircraft would be based on a con-
clusion that the due process clause, never before protecting in a mili-
tary context the kind of discrimination the contractor is claiming,
superseded Congress's and the President's express authority in Arti-
cles I and II to oversee and command the military.24'
Professor Bakken's hypothetical illustrates the difficulty that a con-
stitutional challenge to DADT would encounter in the face of judicial
235. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952)).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1232-33.
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deference in military matters. The military's motivation for choosing
helicopters over fixed-wing aircraft or heterosexual over homosexual
might be an operational necessity.242 The military's conclusion may be
based on prejudice toward the contractor or homosexuals, and this con-
clusion might be very wrong.2 43 However, the Supreme Court has con-
cluded that the judge "can almost never be a more effective decision
maker than a military leader when military matters are at issue, even
when the military is restricting what is in the civilian context a [constitu-
tional] right." 244
Furthermore, some argue that, when courts defer to another institu-
tion because that institution has greater expertise on the matter (in this
case the military) or because that institution has the superior legal
authority (in this case Congress), these "deferee" institutions owe recip-
rocal obligations to the deferring institution.245 Notably, as Professor
Horwitz noted, this deferee party is expected to
observe a minimum level of appropriate process in its delibera-
tions. . . . [T]hose deliberations should be sufficiently structured and
transparent to earn the trust of the deferring institution, and the
deferee should take some pains to explain its reasons and its process
in a way that provides a similar assurance that its conclusions are the
result of a meaningful, full, and fair exercise of its expertise.246
Moreover, Professor Horwitz noted, "[O]ne of the foundations of legal
authority-based deference is that the Constitution has equipped the polit-
ical branches with a variety of mechanisms to ensure sound, legitimate,
and accountable decisionmaking . . . [including] open, extended, and
transparent deliberation, and a meaningful opportunity to air opposing
viewpoints. 247
Perhaps this argument explains why the outcome of Witt seems jus-
tifiable even though the court supported its conclusions with unconvinc-
ing arguments. DADT was approved by Congress and signed by the
President after considerable deliberations and public discourse.248 The
detailed legislative record indicates that Congress's conclusion that
DADT was necessary to preserve the military's effectiveness as a fight-
ing force were "the result of a meaningful, full, and fair exercise of its
expertise." But that was fifteen years ago. Today, it is difficult to ignore
the mounting evidence suggesting that even after careful deliberation,
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1233-34.
245. Horwitz, supra note 138, at 1102.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 60 (1st Cir. 2008).
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Congress was wrong."'
This does not mean that courts should disregard the doctrine of
judicial deference and strike down DADT. Instead, Congress should
take the opportunity to repeal DADT. For example, when President
Barack Obama's Press Secretary Robert Gibbs was asked if the new
administration would "get rid of the Don't Ask Don't Tell" policy, he
replied, "you don't hear a politician give a one-word answer much. But
it's, 'Yes.' "250 This may indicate that President Obama has opened a
window of opportunity for overturning DADT.251 More importantly, if
the President's commitment proves real and he pushes for repeal of
DADT, he would likely do so either through the Congress or from
within the military.252 If Congress decides to take another look at
DADT, it can engage this sensitive issue with "open, extended, and
transparent deliberation, and a meaningful opportunity to air opposing
viewpoints. 253 Congress can have military leaders publicly explain their
rationale for supporting the continuation of DADT in light of the new
evidence. Furthermore, Congress can hear testimony from military lead-
ers that oppose DADT; this would help present the repeal of DADT to
the public, not as a political endeavor but as a change emanating from
within the armed forces.254 In this way, the decision to abolish DADT
would come from an elected body, and it would be carried by at least
some voices from inside the military as opposed to coming from the
nine Justices on the Supreme Court.
249. See discussion supra Part III.
250. Carl Cameron, Obama To End Military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy,
FOXNEWS.COM, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.foxnews.comlstory/0,2933,479952,00.html.
251. But see id. ("An Obama adviser and retired Air Force General Merrill McPeak has stated
DADT should be retained. Perhaps the statement by White House Press Secretary Gibbs helps to
clarify President Obama's position and his commitment to effectively ending DADT.").
252. Id.
253. Horwitz, supra note 138, at 1102.
254. An open letter signed by 104 retired Generals and Admirals calls for the repeal of DADT.
We-the undersigned-respectfully call for the repeal of the "don't ask, don't tell"
policy. Those of us endorsing this letter have dedicated our lives to defending the
rights of our citizens to believe whatever they wish. Scholarly data shows there are
approximately one million gay and lesbian veterans in the United States today as
well as 65,000 gays and lesbians currently serving in our armed forces. They have
served our nation honorably. We support the recent comments of former Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, General John Shalikashvili, who has concluded that repealing
the "don't ask, don't tell" policy would not harm and would indeed help our armed
forces. As is the case with Great Britain, Israel, and other nations that allow gays
and lesbians to serve openly, our service members are professionals who are able to
work together effectively despite differences in race, gender, religion, and sexuality.
Such collaboration reflects the strength and the best traditions of our democracy.
Nathaniel Frank, 104 Generals and Admirals: Gay Ban Must End, Nov. 17, 2008, http://
palmcenter.org/press/dadt/releases/104Generals%2526Admirals-GayBanMustEnd.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The opinions in Cook v. Gates and Witt v. Department of the Air
Force illustrate why pursuing the repeal of DADT through executive
and congressional channels, instead of judicial channels, would be ideal.
Cook shows that a challenge to the constitutionality of DADT is likely
to be disregarded under the doctrine of judicial deference to the military.
Although opinions vary on whether this doctrine is still sound, the Rob-
erts Court has signaled that it will continue to uphold it. On the other
hand, Witt shows that, even if a court believes that the doctrine of judi-
cial deference is not enough to stop the court from reaching the constitu-
tionality question, the courts are left with little guidance as to how to
apply Lawrence's holding to private homosexual conduct in the military
context. Although the Ninth Circuit attempted to resolve this issue in
Witt, the court ended up stretching Supreme Court precedent to such a
degree that its opinion was unfortunately unconvincing.
